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Abstract Thedesignofoptimalenvironmentalpolicyinheritsmodeluncertainty.We
investigate the consequences in a simple linear model, where the aim of the poli-
cymaker is to stabilise the atmospheric content of carbon. We study how decision-
makers’ concerns about robustness alters policy using the Hansen and Sargent
(2003, 2008) approach. The analysis shows that a policymaker, who fears about
model misspecification should react more aggressively to changes in the stock of
atmospheric carbon and reduce emissions stronger.
1 Introduction
Model uncertainty is an important issue in the context of environmental policy for
at least two reasons: First, we do not know enough about the evolution of the
ecological system (physical system uncertainty).1 Second, we do not know much
about future costs of environmental damage or future benefits from avoiding it
1TherecentlypublishedfourthassessmentreportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange
(IPCC) illustrates a curious aspect of the science of climate change. Studying the climate system
reveals new, little understood, mechanisms and feedback effects that may increase or decrease
warming. So as understanding grows, predictions become less, rather than more certain. Thus, the
IPCC’s range of predictions of the rise in the temperature by 2100 has increased from 1.4–5.8% in
the 2001 report to 1.1.–6.4% in the latest report (see http://www.ipcc.ch/).
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(economic uncertainty).2 Therefore, the uncertainty inherent in environmental and
economic modelling is receiving increasing attention and many policymakers are
worried about the unknown unknows.
Several studies have analysed the impact of uncertainty on optimal timing prob-
lems [see for example Pindyck (2000) or Pindyck (2001)]. Baker (2005), Keller
et al. (2004) and Webster (2002) have discussed the question of acting now or waiting
in an integrated assessment model with active learning. Baker et al. (2006) have
discussed that R&D into technologies with low emissions might be a hedge against
uncertainty. Webster et al. (2003) calculate probability distribution functions for
uncertain parameters in ecological models and provide probability distributions for
future climate projections based on current uncertainty in model parameters.
In this paper we focus on one particular aspect of uncertainty, namely how optimal
policy decisions depend upon uncertainty about the “true” model. In other words,
we contribute to the uncertainty literature by studying how environmental policy-
makers’ concerns about model robustness alter optimal environmental policy. In
contrast to stochastic control, robust control methods seek to bound the uncertainty
rather than express it in the form of a probability distribution. Given a bound on the
uncertainty, the control can deliver results that meet the control system requirements
in all potential cases. Therefore robust control theory might be stated as a worst-case
analysismethodratherthanatypicalcasemethod.Thus,theprocedureisparticularly
suitable to deal with low-probability extreme climate events.
To reflect the fear of the policymaker about misbehaving models, we use recently
developed robust control techniques by Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2008,h e n c e f o r t h
HS) which is based on the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) minmax approach. HS have
initiated a research agenda that introduces the notion of robustness to model un-
certainty and concern about model misspecification. Methodologically they modify
techniques from the robust control literature in applied mathematics. In a nutshell,
the fundamental idea of robustness is that economic and environmental models are
at best viewed as stylised approximations of reality rather than perfect descriptions
thereof. When policy-makers use a particular model as guidance in a dynamic
decision-making situation and worry that the model be misspecified, one would
expect them to insist on considering alternative models in order to obtain decision
rules that not only work well with the baseline model but also work reasonably
well when the model is misspecified. This is the sense in which a policy is designed
to be robust. In this paper, the policymakers are assumed to achieve robustness
by considering a worst-case model that is similar to and statistically difficult to
distinguish from the baseline model. In other words, the policymaker considers a
2Most economists reckon that, if greenhouse-gas emissions continue on their current path, the costs
of climate change would be between zero (where the benefits of warming to cold countries balances
out the costs) and 3% of global GDP over the next 100 years. See, for example, Ingham and Ulph
(2003) for a survey about uncertainty concerning the calculations of the social costs of carbon and
Tol (2005) for a summary of 103 empirical studies on the marginal costs of carbon. Paraphrasing a
quote from Alan Greenspan on monetary policy uncertainty one may say: “Uncertainty is not just an
important feature of the environmental economics landscape, it is the defining characteristic of that
landscape”.
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set of alternative models which are “close” to the baseline model where distance
between the models is measured by an entropy or likelihood-type criterion.3
In the existing literature, this methodology has been extensively used for the
design of monetary policy under uncertainty. It has overturned Brainard’s (1967)
conservatism principle and provides a rationale for monetary policy reacting more
aggressivelyonchangesinoutputandinflationundermodeluncertaintycomparedto
an environment without model uncertainty.4 The only applications of this technique
on an environmental model so far are Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas (2004)a n d
Gonzalez (2008). Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas (2004) discuss the precautionary
behaviour under robust resource management, when surface water flows are as-
sumed to be stochastic, and a policymaker is concerned about uncertainty. The
authors show that in a dynamic setting, under worst case rainfall shortcomings, ro-
bustness implies lower surface water applications. Gonzalez (2008) analyses optimal
pollution taxes and welfare when model uncertainty is modelled by means of robust
control. In contrast to these two papers, the main topic of our paper is to analyse
robust CO2 abatement policies in an uncertain model context.
The paper proceeds as follows. As a foundation for the subsequent analysis, in
Section 2 we briefly introduce the notion of robustness laid out by HS. The baseline
model is introduced in Section 3. Building on the robustness concept, in Section 4
we proceed to an analysis of a policymakers who faces uncertainty about the model
on which he bases optimal policy. Finally, Section 5 summarises and draws some
conclusions.
2 Hansen–Sargent robustness
Doubts about models have existed for as long as models themselves have. This
section gives an intuitive introduction to the recently developed concept of HS
robustness, which deals with uncertainty by deriving optimal solutions in a restricted
worst case model, where the restriction in turn depends on the underlying model.5
The core of the idea is to treat the decision maker’s model as an approximation
of the true model. Let x be a vector of state variables and let the true data follow a
Markov-process with a transition density f(x∗|x).6 Moreover, let the approximating
model be described by a transition density fα(x∗|x) (α ∈ A,w h e r eA denotes a
3Optimal policies under uncertainty can be approached in different ways besides the one used here
focussing on robustness under model uncertainty. For a road map of alternative approaches, see
Christodoulakis et al. (1993).
4Yohe (2007) covers the productive dialogue between the conduct of monetary policy and climate
mitigation. In both subject areas decision makers are inclined to hedge against abrupt and intolerable
impacts with which they must cope. In the realm of climate policy, for example, the possibility of a
sudden collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation comes in mind as an intolarable impact. In
the realm of monetary policy, for example, central banks try to hedge against the risk of deflation or
financial turmoil like in the recent crisis 2007–2009.
5A high volume of research in robust control over the past 15 years has led to a growth in
techniques. The following methodological part draws upon the more complete discussions in HS.
The descriptions of the technique focus both upon the overall concept and on the details of the
mathematics.
6* denotes next period values.
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Econometrician  Hansen-Sargent Robust Policymaker
Note: Whereas an econometrician would minimise the distance between f and f   , a HS robust policymaker 
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Fig. 1 An econometrician vs. a Hansen–Sargent robust policymaker [adopted from Hansen and
Sargent (2008)]
compact set of parameter values). Then the maximum likelihood estimator ˆ α0 would
be derived by minimizing the relative entropy of f and fα [I(α, f)], which measures
the “expected distance” between f and fα and is defined as the expectation of the
log likelihood ratio conditioned on the approximating model. The HS methodology
inverts this approach by taking fα as given, and builds a set of possible data
generating processes around this model, so that the true model is one model in this
set. This is graphically shown in Fig. 1.
A standard result in optimal control theory is certainty equivalence, which results
under the assumption of a linear model with additive uncertainty and a quadratic
loss function. Centaintly equivalence implies that only the mean values, i.e. the
probability-weighted average outcomes of target variables matter for the optimal
setting. Certainty equivalence therefore implies that low probability disturbances
should not be taken into account, only the first (statistical) moment matters for
policy, not the higher moments. In order to come to grips with this problem, robust
control theorists add an additional vector process {ωt+1} to the model that depends
in a possibly non-linear way on the history of the state variables:
xt+1 = Axt + But + C(εt+1 + ωt+1), (1)
where u denotes a vector of control variables, and A, B and C are matrices, filled
with appropriate structural parameters.7 For convenience, let’s assume that the loss
function of the decision maker is convex and given by r(x,u) =| z|2. Then the robust







z z − θδw∗ w∗ + δV(x∗)

(2)
subject to Eq. 1 where E is the expectations operator and θ>0 represents the
decision maker’s preference for robustness. The preference for robustness falls
7Note that the additional shock terms ωt+1 and therefore the misspecification of the model are
masked by the shock terms εt+1 and thus cannot be observed.
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as θ rises, so that the problem is equal to its non-robust version when θ reaches
infinity.
In Eq. 2 the usual minimisation problem is transformed into a min-max problem.
The solution of Eq. 2 incorporates now the worst case ω as a function of x and u and
the corresponding decision rule u =− Fx depends on C. Intuitively, the policymaker
wants to minimise the maximum welfare loss due to model misspecifications by
specifying an appropriate environmental policy which shields the economy from
the worst possible scenario.8 The additional process can be interpreted as a second
malevolent player, trying to distort the model as strong as possible.9
To restrict the second player, who would otherwise distort the model without








t+1ωt+1 ≤ η0 (3)
In Eq. 3 a n di nF i g .1, the set of distorted models can be seen as a ball around the
approximating model with η0 defining the radius of the ball.10 Intuitively, model
uncertainty manifests itself in just one additional parameter although the framework
covers a wide range of misspecified dynamics including wrong parameters (vt+1 is a
linear function of xt), autocorrelated errors (vt+1 is a linear function of xt), and/or
ignored nonlinearities (vt+1 is a nonlinear function of xt).11 It can be verified that
the restriction upon the evil agent (the choice of η0) depends on θ. Thus, all types
of misspecification are handled by specifying only one parameter, θ.12 Al o w e rθ
means that the policymaker designs a policy which is appropriate for a wider set
of model misspecifications. Therefore, a lower θ is equivalent to a higher degree of
robustness.13
The choice of the robustness parameter is therefore crucial for the choice of a
plausible range of model uncertainty. To overcome the problem of specifying an
arbitrary range for θ, we follow HS and employ what they refer to as a detection error
probability approach. The basic idea is that the alternative models a policymaker
faces should not be easily distinguishable (detectable) with a reasonable set of data.
HS employ statistical theory to formulate a probability for discriminating between
8Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) have shown that choices based on extreme outcomes are rational when
decision makers are confronted with Knightian uncertainty and therefore cannot assign probabilities.
9The fictitious second rational agent is a metaphor and can also be called “nature”. Nevertheless, one
interpretation may be to consider country 1 that tries to reduce emissions but is afraid that country 2
will undo all its good work. Thereby country 2 would alter the properties of the model.
10By means of η0 the decision maker can be modelled to be cautious rather than trying to avoid
improbable catastrophic events.
11This is an advantage as it simplifies the analysis, but it also implies that it is not possible to study the
impact of specific types of uncertainty. The standard modelling approach without model uncertainty
corresponds to η0 =0 .
12In fact, the size of ωt+1 is directly penalized through θ, which is equivalent to the Lagrange
multiplier on (2) in a min-max problem E0(

r(xt, ut)) subject to (1)a n d( 3).
13One limitation of the HS approach is that policy makers are not allowed to learn about model
uncertainty over time.
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the approximating model and the distorted model and to obtain a model-specific
θ. With equal prior weights the Bayesian detection error probability is defined as
p(θ) = 1/2 (pa + pd),w h e r epi represents the frequency of simulations with a log
likelihood ratio smaller or equal to zero, when the approximating (i = a) or the
distorted (i = d) model is assumed to be the data generating process. HS suggest
to set p(θ) at a plausible value and then invert p(θ) to find a plausible value for the
robustnessparameter.Theyadvisetheuseofvalueforthedetectionerrorprobability
around 10% in a sample of size 150.
The HS approach presented above will facilitate the analysis of environmental
policy under model uncertainty in subsequent sections.
3 The baseline model
The reduced-form baseline model is in the spirit of Pindyck (2001). However, we
do not study the optimal timing of adopting an irreversible policy. Instead, we focus
on the question, whether a stabilisation policy should be more aggressive, when a
policymaker is concerned about uncertainty. We assume that the authority is able to
control the path of emissions, but do not specify possible policies, such as taxes on
emissions or the adoption of technologies or implementation of sinks, respectively.
Moreover, we assume that reducing emissions is costly.
For convenience our analysis exemplarily focuses on the concentration of carbon.
However, this approach can be used for every other stock of environmental pollu-
tants,whichfulfilthefollowingassumptions.LetCAt beastatevariable,representing
the average concentration of carbon in the atmosphere, and COt be the control
variable, representing the rate of CO2 emissions.14 Then the evolution of CAt can
be described by
CAt = (1 − κ)CAt−1 + βCOt−1 + eCA,t (4)
where κ i st h er a t ea tw h i c hC O 2-emissions rise the average concentration of carbon
in the atmosphere, β represents the natural rate at which the stock of carbon con-
centration dissipates, and eCA,t represents a Gaussian identically and independently
distributed (i.i.d.) shock process with zero mean and a variance of one. This shock
captures all exogenous disturbances, which influence the evolution of the carbon
concentration, and are not involved in Eq. 4. If the policymaker aims at stabilising
the atmospheric concentration of carbon, Eq. 4 leads to the equilibrium condition





By subtracting the equilibrium relationship, Eq. 4 can be expressed in absolute
differences from equilibrium:
cat = (1 − κ)cat−1 + βcot−1 + eca,t, (6)
where lower case letters represent absolute deviations from equilibrium, for example
cot = COt− CO. We assume the following convex loss-function, representing the
14We assume that without policy intervention, COt follows an exogenous trajectory.
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preferenceforastabilisationofcarbonconcentrationaroundaparticularequilibrium
value
Lt = γ (cat)
2 (7)
where γ reflects the preference for stabilisation and influences the speed of conver-
gence to equilibrium.15 Following Baker (2005, p. 24), we assume that the costs Ct
of reducing emissions by a particular policy are a quadratic function of the reduction
 COt.16 Formally,
Ct = λ(COt − COt−1)
2 = λ(cot − cot−1)
2 (8)
where λ reflects the quadratic costs of mitigation. The goal of the social planner is
to stabilize the carbon concentration on a predetermined equilibrium value under























2 − γ (cat)
2	
(9)
subject to (6), where δ represents the discount factor. The discount factor comprises
the principlethat decisionmakerscaremoreaboutthe presentgenerationthanabout
subsequent generations. However, the policymaker is unsure about the accuracy of
the model. The decision maker knows that the model represents only an approxima-
tion to the true relationship. Consequently, the model could be subject to a range of
distortions. Therefore, the task is to reformulate the optimisation problem such that
the resulting policy rule performs reasonably well even if the model deviates from
the baseline model.
4 Optimal robust policy
Keeping the preceding analysis in mind, let us now examine the resulting optimal















15The loss function (7) is a shortcut suppressing the fact that policymakers in democratic societies are
under pressure from various interest groups and therefore have to enact environmental regulation
through a lengthy political bargaining process.
16Pindyck (2001) has assumed a linear cost function for simplicity, but mentioned that one would
generally expect costs to be convex.
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where {ψt+i, i ≥ 0} is the sequence of Lagrangian multipliers. For simplicity we solve
the problem as if the social planner is able to choose optimal values for {cot+i, i ≥ 0}
and {cat, i ≥ 0}. In a second step we then solve for the optimal path of the control
variable {cot}. The first order conditions from (10) are given by
{cot+i} : 2λδiEt ( cot+i) − 2λδi+1Et ( cot+1+i) + βδi+1Et (ψt+1+i) = 0 (11)
{cat+i} : 2γδiEt (cat+i) = (1 − κ)δi+1Et (ψt+1+i) − δiEt (ψt+i) (12)
Transforming (11)l e a d st o








Et ( cot+1+i) − δ−1Et ( cot+i)

, (13)

















where we used Et(cot+i) = cot+i (∀t,i), since we assume that the policymaker controls
emissions. The optimal amount of additional emissions at time t depends negatively
on the deviation of the concentration of carbon from equilibrium, but positively
on  cot+1 and  cot−1, where future values are discounted and lagged values are
projected. The first term reflects, that a higher deviation in the concentration
of carbon causes higher social costs and tends to reduce the optimal amount of
emissions, when concentrations are above equilibrium. The second term reflects,
that a higher reduction of emissions causes costs. Therefore this term smoothes the
path of emissions. With rising β, the influence of emissions on the average carbon
concentration increases, and emissions should be lowered. The same holds for γ,
since γ reflects the preference for carbon stabilisation and punishes deviations of the
average carbon concentration from equilibrium. For λ the opposite is true: when
the costs of reducing a particular amount of emissions rises, the optimal amount
increases. With a rising rate at which the stock of carbon concentration dissipates,
emissions become less damaging and also increase (∂ cot /∂κ > 0). Equations (6)–
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The sequence {eco,t+1} is a second i.i.d. shock process with zero mean and a variance
of one, and reflects that emissions can not be perfectly controlled by the policymaker.
To reflect a concern for model misspecification by using HS robust modeling
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t ˜ Qxt + 2x 
t ˜ U ˜ ut + ˜ u 
t ˜ R˜ ut

(16)





























Equation (16) completely characterises the optimal policy strategy taking explic-
itly into account environmental model uncertainty.
Since we believe that plausible values for the stabilization preference should be
related to marginal costs of CO2-emissions, we use empirical studies on marginal
costs to derive plausible values for γ. The marginal damage cost is defined as
the net present value of the incremental damage due to a marginal increase in
CO2 emissions. Unfortunately, for almost all parameters there is wide disagreement
between experts. Therefore it is crucial to subject all results to sensitivity testing. Our
marginal cost estimates are derived from Tol (2005), who summarizes 103 empirical
studies and builds one composite probability density function for all studies. As we
believe, that estimates should withstand a quality test, we rely only on peer-reviewed
studies and use the mode (5 $/ton of carbon), the mean (50 $/tC), the median
(14 $/tC), the 5% percentile (−9 $/tC) and the 95% percentile (245 $/tC) from Tol’s
(2005) density function for those studies.
For the costs of mitigation we rely on the estimates of Van Vuuren et al. (2006)
who summarize results from 18 different model approaches, and run simulations for
the highest and the lowest values, as well as for the mean of all studies. The rate
of dissipation (κ) is assumed to be 0.01, and for the rate at which emissions rise the
average concentration of carbon (β) we use a value of 0.99. The discount factor is
set to δ = 0.96 which corresponds to a continuous discount rate of 4% (δ = 0.96 =
e−0.04).17
Formally, policy rules resulting from the optimisation problem (16) solve for the
optimal strategy and are of the form cot = acot−1 + bcat.
In Table 1 results for (a, b) are given for different values of λ and γ for the
robust and the non-robust case. Robust solutions are computed for a robustness
parameter θ that corresponds to a detection error probability near 10% in a sam-
ple of 150, using Monte Carlo simulations. Several points deserve emphasis. All
parameter combinations clearly show that losses rise under uncertainty, and that
a robust policymaker should react more aggressively on deviations of carbon from
equilibrium. Furthermore, all reaction parameters on last periods emissions decrease
17We acknowledge that the choice of discount rate is still a controversial issue. Other discount rates
will affect the shape of the impulse response functions, but the qualitative findings of the paper will
remain unswayed.
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Table 1 Optimal policy rule parameters (a, b)
λ 5600 $/Gt2 202600 $/Gt2 224000 $/Gt2
γθ =∞ p(θ)≈10% θ =∞ p(θ)≈10% θ =∞ p(θ)≈10%
−0.09 $/Gt2 (0.5027, (0.4007, (0.5024, 0) (0.4007, 0) (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0)
0.0001) 0.0002)
Loss 559970 636320 20244000 23020000 22380000 25448000
0.05 $/Gt2 (0.5025, (0.4009, (0.5024, 0) (0.4007, 0) (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0)
−0.0001) −0.0001)
Loss 560000 636110 20244000 23020000 22380000 25448000
0.14 $/Gt2 (0.5023, (0.4008, (0.5024, 0) (0.4007, 0) (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0)
−0.0002) −0.0003)
Loss 560010 636090 20244000 23020000 22380000 25448000
0.5 $/Gt2 (0.5018, (0.4010, (0.5024, 0) (0.4007, 0) (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0)
−0.0007) −0.0009)
Loss 560070 635740 20244000 23020000 22380000 25448000
2.45 $/Gt2 (0.4996, (0.4, (0.5023, (0.4007, (0.5023, (0.4008,
−0.0029) −0.0039) −0.0001) −0.0001) −0.0001) −0.0001)
Loss 560340 635320 20244000 23019000 22381000 25448000
(increase in absolute value), which can also be interpreted as a more aggressive
stabilizationpolicy.18 Thus,thepolicymakeradoptsamoreprudent,orprecautionary
standpoint.19
Notice also that with rising mitigation costs, optimal policies become more de-
fensive. When a reduction in emissions is more expensive, the policymaker reacts
with more patience and the optimal path to equilibrium is prolonged. Thus it is
no surprise that also losses rise when mitigation costs do. In opposition, a rise in
the stabilization preference parameter leads to more aggressive policies, in order
to reduce the atmospheric carbon content. For higher mitigation costs the results
seem to be very robust, since optimal policies and losses are nearly identical for
all preference parameters. Furthermore, optimal reaction functions for λ = 202600
$/Gt2 and λ = 224000 $/Gt2 do not differ substantially.
Estimations of Van Vuuren et al. (2006) are based on the assumption of full
global participation by all countries as early as 2000, which seems to be not the
case. Thus, the calibration of the mitigation costs might be too optimistic.20 We
reflect this by reporting results for a 10% higher value of mitigation costs in Table 2.
The outcomes seem to be quite robust, since losses and reaction parameters do
not change considerably, and conclusions are qualitatively the same. Obviously,
increasing mitigation costs lead to stronger reactions and higher losses.
To illustrate the differences due to uncertainty, we simulate the paths for cat and
cot for three different stabilisation scenarios: In the first scenario the policymaker
18The only exception is the first row in Fig. 2, where reaction parameters on cat are positive, due to
the negative preference parameter.
19This result is similar to the findings of Roughgarden and Schneider (1999) obtained in a different
setting.
20Latest findings about on the costs of stabilization targets can be found in the most recent EMF22
study (see http://emf.stanford.edu/events/emfbriefing_on_climate_policy_scenarios_us_domestic_
and_international_policy_architectures).
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Table 2 Optimal policy rule parameters (a, b) for 10% higher mitigation costs
λ 6160 $/Gt2 222860 $/Gt2 246400 $/Gt2
γθ =∞ p(θ)≈10% θ =∞ p(θ)≈10% θ =∞ p(θ)≈10%
−0.09 $/Gt2 (0.5026, (0.4008, (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0) (0.5023, 0) (0.4010, 0)
0.0001) 0.0002)
Loss 615990 699910 22266000 25320000 24616000 27988000
0.05 $/Gt2 (0.5025, (0.4010, (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0) (0.5023, 0) (0.4010, 0)
−0.0001) −0.0001)
Loss 615980 699650 22266000 25320000 24616000 27988000
0.14 $/Gt2 (0.5023, (0.4009, (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0) (0.5023, 0) (0.4010, 0)
−0.0002) −0.0003)
Loss 615980 699610 22266000 25320000 24616000 27988000
0.5 $/Gt2 (0.5019, (0.4009, (0.5024, 0) (0.4008, 0) (0.5023, 0) (0.4010, 0)
−0.0006) −0.0009)
Loss 615970 699300 22266000 25320000 24616000 27988000
2.45 $/Gt2 (0.4997, (0.4, (0.5023, (0.4007, (0.5023, (0.4009,
−0.0027) −0.0037) −0.0001) −0.0001) −0.0001) −0.0001)
Loss 615920 698440 22266000 25319000 24616000 27987000
tries to stabilize the carbon concentration on today’s value, which is assumed to be
760 Gt of carbon equivalent.21 Due to (5) the corresponding equilibrium amount of
CO2 emissions is 7.68 Gt carbon equivalent. For the second scenario we assume a
policymaker, who wants to reduce the carbon concentration to 600 Gt, which implies
equilibrium emissions of 6.06 Gt. Scenario 3 refers to stabilizing the atmospheric
concentration at 500 Gt, which leads to 5.05 Gt equilibrium emissions. As optimal
policies do not differ much for high values of λ, and medium values for γ, simulations
are done for λ = {0.14, 2.45} and γ = {5600, 202600}. For all simulations we used start
values for CA of 760 Gt and for CO of 8 Gt.
The resulting graphs are shown in Fig. 2 and confirm the suggestions from Table 1.
We run simulations for the standard optimal policy without a concern for robustness
(black line), for the robust solution under uncertainty (red line), and for the robust
rule in the approximating model without evil agent (green line).
Several insights emerge from this exercise. The impulse response functions sug-
gest, that emissions should be stabilized within the next 5–7 years. However, the
stabilization of atmospheric carbon content would nevertheless need round about
400 years. Concerning the results under uncertainty, the Figures show, that emissions
reductions are prolonged by 2–3 years, when we introduce the evil agent, although
the policy is more aggressive.
Whereas the robust emissions reductions differ substantially from the non-robust
results and the robust policy in the approximating model, the evolution of the
atmospheric carbon content seems to be nearly the same for all simulations and
scenarios, except for scenario I. When the aim of the policymaker is to stabilise
the atmospheric carbon content on today’s level, the concentration rises first by a
small amount, before it returns slowly to its equilibrium value. The robust and non-
robust dynamics look very similar, but using the robust rule in the approximating
environment—the case of unfounded fear of model misspecification—reduces the
21This is in line with the latest estimation of the IPCC of 370 ppmv, see Metz et al. (2005).
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Scenario I:CA=760 Gt,CO=7.68 Gt














































































































































































































































































Scenario II:CA=600 Gt,CO=6.06 Gt













































































































































































































































































Scenario III:CA=500 Gt,CO=5.05 Gt

















































































































































































































































































Fig. 2 Model simulations
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carbon content much faster then in both other cases. Comparing the two columns of
the tables suggest that the policymaker allows the atmospheric content of carbon
to stay above equilibrium for a longer time horizon when the mitigation costs
rise. This can be seen best for a high stabilisation preference. The graphs show
the plausible result, that for a higher preference on stabilisation, emissions should
be reduced stronger, as thus the atmospheric carbon content decreases faster. In
addition, they illustrate that the design of a robust strategy for a policymaker with
a high stabilization preference, and for low mitigation costs is to push policy further
in the direction of reducing emissions even more vigorously.
All simulations illustrate, that the introduction of a second malevolent player im-
plies a higher emissions trajectory, although the reduction policy is more aggressive.
This is compatible with the rise in losses due to uncertainty, shown in Table 1.U s i n g
the robust solution in the approximating model illustrates the increased aggressive-
ness in stabilisation policies, since cat as well as cot reach their equilibrium faster.
A robust environmental policymaker fears stronger damages from not reducing
emissions, and thus chooses a more aggressive reduction policy. The other way
round, model uncertainty doesn’t justify conservatism.
5 Conclusions
Accounting for the vague concept of model uncertainty is a challenging task for
decision makers. The approach in this paper is to provide for model uncertainty via
robust control. We develop a linear quadratic approach to study optimal emissions
paths subject to stabilisation preferences and mitigation costs for three different
scenarios: (1) a stabilisation on today’s atmospheric carbon content (760 Gt carbon
equivalent), (2) a reduction to 600 Gt carbon equivalent, (3) and a reduction to
500 Gt carbon equivalent. For a plausible model specification the results suggest,
that emissions should be stabilized within the next 5–7 years, independent from
the underlying stabilisation scenario. However, even for a stabilisation of emissions
within the next 7 years, the atmospheric carbon content will need about 400 years to
reach its steady state. Furthermore, we investigate optimal reduction policies under
uncertainty, using the appealing HS robust control technique.
What can policymakers with a preference for robustness of optimal policy with
respect to misspecification of the underlying model learn from this research? What
kind of response is appropriate to the climate threat? The optimal policy trajectories
lead to the conclusion that a policymaker who fears model misspecification, should
react more aggressively. This qualitative results resembles those of monetary policy
under model uncertainty.22
Although the example of CO2 emissions is used to demonstrate the robust
modelling approach, the method is transferable to other environmental problems
22Giannoni (2002), Kilponen (2004), Leitemo and Söderström (2004), Onatski and Stock (2002)a n d
Söderström (2002) have examined whether model uncertainty justifies cautious central bankers. The
overall conclusion is that robustness against model misspecification makes monetary policy respond
more aggressively to shocks. Rodriguez (2004, pp. 216–217) has analysed the optimal environmental
policy response to changes in current and future model uncertainty. Like in our analysis, the effect
of current model uncertainty goes in the direction of a more aggressive response.
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surrounded by model uncertainties. We hope that further applications of the robust
modelling technique will soon follow, making use of increasing processor speeds
which makes robustness analysis feasible for larger climate models requiring more
computational time. By doing this, the gap between robust control theory and its
application may be closing.
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